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I. INTRODUCTIONWE present a variety pack of cases decided during the Survey
period-one involving the quality of service required to im-
pose liability on a general partner in a suit against a partner-
ship (only the second Texas appellate decision on the issue), a bankruptcy
case that offered a veritable primer on several Texas partnership law is-
sues, some veil-piercing (a notion that causes shivers in business lawyers!)
cases, a reverse veil-piercing case, and reminder "entity theory" case. As
has been our practice in recent years, we have included limited liability
companies in our coverage.1
A. How To SUE A GENERAL PARTNER
1. KAO Holdings, L.P. v. Young 2
This case involved the quality of service of legal process required to
impose liability on a general partner for a limited partnership obligation.
An elementary rule of partnerships is that general partners of a limited
partnership are jointly and severally liable for the partnership's debts and
obligations.3 Such partners can be sued directly for that liability and to
enforce a judgment obtained against the partnership. 4 The better and
more economical practice is to name the partnership and all of the re-
* B.A., Southern Methodist University (with high honors); J.D., University of Texas
(with honors). Attorney at Law, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
** B.S., Brigham Young University (cum laude); J.D., Duke University (with honors).
Attorney at Law, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. In fact, because the Texas franchise tax laws changed in 2005, mostly removing the
advantage that limited partnerships had over limited liability companies (the former is now
subject to the "margins tax," the successor to the franchise tax that previously applied to
LLCs but not to partnerships), we expect the volume of LLC cases to increase in the com-
ing years.
2. KAO Holdings, L.P. v. Young, 214 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2006, pet. granted), affd as modified by 2008 WL 2404971 (Tex. Jun. 13, 2008).
3. General partners in a limited partnership have the same liabilities to third parties
as a partner in a general partnership. Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act, TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 4.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (art. 6132a et seq. hereinafter
collectively referred to as the "TRLPA"). Such partners have joint and several liability for
all debts and obligations of the partnership. Texas Revised Partnership Act, TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.04 (Vernon Supp. 2008) (art. 6132b et seq. hereinafter
collectively referred to as the "TRPA").
4. TRPA, supra note 3, § 3.05.
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sponsible partners as defendants in the same lawsuit.5 But what happens
if no partners are named as defendants, but one or more actually receives
process served against the partnership? That is what this case is about.
There are several applicable statutory and common law rules: (1) "ex-
cept as otherwise expressly provided by law, a judgment may not be en-
tered against anyone who has not been named as a defendant and served
with process; ''6 (2) in a suit against a partnership, citation may be served
on any general partner;7 (3) a judgment against a partnership is not,
alone, a judgment against a partner; however, "a judgment may be en-
tered against a partner who has been served with process in a suit against
the partnership; '' 8 (4) "[c]itation served on one member of a partnership
authorizes a judgment against the partnership and the partner actually
served;" 9 (5) section 13.03 of the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act
("TRLPA") provides that the Texas Revised Partnership Act ("TRPA")
applies to limited partnerships on matters not covered by the TRLPA;10
and (6) a general partner of a limited partnership has the same liabilities
to those outside the partnership as does a partner in a general
partnership."
The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals used this last authority as
the jumping off point for its decision, stating that "[i]t logically follows
that in a suit against a limited partnership, as in this case, a judgment
entered against the limited partnership, although it is not itself a judg-
ment against a general partner, may also be entered against a general
partner who was served with process.' 2
The court invoked Fincher to support its decision, calling it the "only
Texas appeals court decision that has addressed this issue .. ",13 Fincher
interpreted TRPA section 3.05(c) and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code section 17.022" to mean that a partner served with process in a suit
against the partnership could be held individually liable "even though he
was not named or served individually with process as a defendant in the
suit .... ,,14 We wrote about Fincher in this journal in 1993, which the
5. Following that best practice would have avoided this litigation, too.
6. KAO Holdings, 214 S.W.3d at 507 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 124 (Vernon 2005), and
Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex. 1995)) (emphasis added).
7. Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.022 (Vernon 1997) (the
"TCPRC"), and TRLPA, supra note 3, at § 1.08(a)).
8. TRPA, supra note 3, at § 3.05 (emphasis added). See KAO Holdings, 214 S.W.3d
at 508-09 n.10 (explaining why this TRPA provision applies to a limited partnership) (em-
phasis added).
9. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.022 (Vernon 2008).
10. KAO Holdings, 214 S.W.3d at 508 n.6. This is sometimes referred to as the
"linkage" section because it "links" the two partnership statutes in the manner indicated.
11. As noted above in footnote 3, this is joint and several liability for the debts and
obligations of the partnership. TRLPA, supra note 3, at § 4.03(b); TRPA, supra note 3, at
§ 3.04.
12. KAO Holdings, 214 S.W.3d at 508 n.6 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.022 (Vernon 1997) and Fincher v. B & D Air Conditioning & Heating Co., 816 S.W.2d
509, 512 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied)).




court cited in a footnote.15 There, we said:
Even though a partner is jointly and severally liable for, and there-
fore can be sued on, liabilities established by judgments against the
partnership, the assets of the partner can be reached only when there
is a judgment against the partner, individually. Therefore, the court's
interpretation of Section 17.022 of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code was important in determining whether a new, separate suit
against the individual partner was required. The court held that
when Fincher received actual service as general partner for Yellow
Ribbon, even in his capacity as trustee, Fincher was also before the
trial court as a general partner. Therefore, a judgment establishing
partnership liability was also a judgment against the partner
individually. 16
Here the court agreed with the analysis in Fincher, essentially finding
that a general partner knows that it has joint and several liability for the
obligations of a partnership and that merely being served with citation in
a lawsuit against the partnership, whether or not the general partner is
named individually as a defendant, puts that general partner on notice of
a claim that could result in its having liability.17 The end result was a
judgment finding liability on both the partnership and the served but un-
named partner. 18
What does that mean? It means that a separate lawsuit against a gen-
eral partner relating to partnership liability is unnecessary when the gen-
eral partner receives a copy of the lawsuit. On the other hand, if there
were other general partners who were not served, then a separate lawsuit
against them would be required to recover from them individually for
their partnership liability. That liability does not have to be re-estab-
lished, but a separate lawsuit would be required to pursue the individual
assets of those liable partners.
The court bolstered its conclusion by pointing to section 152.306(a) of
the Texas Business Organizations Code ("TBOC"), 19 and to the Texas
Supreme Court's refusal to review Fincher. Further, the court invoked
the Texas common law principle that where a statute is "interpreted by a
court of last resort and reenacted without substantial change, the Legisla-
ture is presumed to have been familiar with that interpretation and to
have adopted it."'20 Perhaps because there was a dissent in the case, the
court punctuated its conclusion: "Under these circumstances, we have no
legal authority, rationale, or other proper basis to depart from the inter-
15. See id. at 509 n.7.
16. Steven A. Waters & Felicity A. Fowler, Partnerships, 46 SMU L. REV. 1631, 1645
(1993) (footnotes omitted).
17. KAO Holdings, 214 S.W.3d at 508-09.
18. Id.
19. TEX. Bus. ORGs. CODE ANN. § 152.306(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (the same as
TRPA, supra note 3, at § 3.05(c), though now two sentences instead of one).
20. KAO Holdings, 214 S.W.3d at 509 (citing Tex. Dep't of Protective and Regulatory




The dissent was a vigorous one. In fact, the dissenting opinion was
almost twice as long as the majority opinion and is an interesting read.
Mainly, the dissent seemed to be offended by a result that sustained a
default judgment against a defendant who was not specifically named as a
defendant and served as part of that individual claim. 22 The dissent re-
peatedly cited Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission. v. Si-
erra Club 23 for the proposition that "service of citation" is a term of art
describing service addressed to a person that informs the person that he
has been sued and "commands [the person] to appear and answer the
opposing party's claims."'24 Though reciting that "a judgment may be en-
tered against a partner who has been served with process in a suit against
the partnership, ' 25 the dissent goes further and reads section 17.022 to
allow the following: "[I]f a partner is served with citation informing the
partner that he has been sued, then service of citation is not also necessary
as to the partnership. '2 6 But, TRPA section 3.05(c) 27 does not require
that a partner be directly so informed-the scheme there is that service of
citation on a partnership is effected by serving a general partner; there-
fore, you get a "two-fer," because the partnership and any partner served
with that citation are considered to be before the court. The dissent ap-
pears not to disagree with the notion that serving a general partner with a
suit against the partnership is effective. Rather, the dissent argued that a
suit naming the general partner is effective against the partnership when
the suit merely names the general partner.28 The problem is that notion
does not work under TRPA section 3.05(c), which requires "a suit against
the partnership. '2 9
Although the dissent worked hard to cite a variety of authorities, both
within and outside Texas, mainly, the dissent seemingly could not suffer
the idea of a default judgment against a partner who had not been "hit
over the head" with the fact that it, individually, could be responsible for
the claims made in the lawsuit.30
As noted, the best practice is to name the partnership and all liable
partners as party defendants in the lawsuit.
21. KAO Holdings, 214 S.W.3d at 509.
22. Id. at 510.
23. 70 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex. 2002).
24. KAO Holdings, 214 S.W.3d at 514.
25. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.022 (Vernon 2008).
26. KAO Holdings, 214 S.W.3d at 514 (emphasis added).
27. See TRPA, supra note 3, at § 3.05(c).
28. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.022 (Vernon 2008), taken alone, could
be read that way.
29. TRPA, supra note 3, at § 3.05(c).
30. One of the opinion's headings was a dead giveaway of Justice Frost's feelings:
"Does article 6132b-3.05(c) of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes allow a plaintiff to obtain a





1. In re Wilson 31
This was a bankruptcy adversary proceeding that included a claim of
breach of fiduciary duty. Whether that claim could be sustained de-
pended on whether there was a basis for it, which the court tied to finding
a partnership. 3
2
There was no written partnership agreement to guide the court, forcing
an analysis of the relevant statutory provision that bears on the existence
(or not) of a partnership, TRPA section 2.02. 33 The court found enough
evidence of the existence of a partnership to deny the defendants' sum-
mary judgment motion.34
The defendants argued that an oral partnership could not be enforced
because of the statute of frauds.35 The court dispatched that argument,
on the basis that oral partnerships are valid in Texas 36 and, more impor-
tantly, it found no evidence that the partnership could not "be performed
within a year.'37
C. DUTIES OWED By PARTNERS
1. In re Kilroy38
This is the first of two bankruptcy cases involving Mr. Kilroy that are
discussed in this Survey article. The reader should note that the two
cases, though both styled "In re Kilroy," involve separate plaintiff parties,
distinct questions of fact and law, and Texas and Delaware law.
The first issue in this case was whether Guerriero had standing to bring
suit on behalf of a limited liability company ("LLC"), W & L, that was
the general partner of a limited partnership, Aegis. If Guerriero was a
31. In re Wilson, 355 B.R. 600 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
32. Apparently, the court found no evidence of any other relational basis for such a
duty to arise.
33. Wilson, 355 B.R. at 604-05; TRPA, supra note 3, at § 2.02.
34. Essentially, the court relied on the testimony of the other party "that there was an
understanding that a partnership was created," which the court said created a material
issue of fact for trial, rendering the matter unsuitable for summary judgment. Wilson, 355
B.R. at 605-07.
35. Wilson, 355 B.R. at 605; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon Supp.
2008).
36. Wilson, 355 B.R. at 605. Interestingly, the court offered no support for that state-
ment. It could have cited the following: "'Partnership agreement' means any agreement,
written or oral, of the partners concerning a partnership." TRPA, supra note 3, at
§1.01(12) (emphasis added)
37. Wilson, 355 B.R. at 605 (citing Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1982)).
Under Texas law, the general rule is that where the parties have not fixed a time for per-
formance and the contracted issue does not explicitly state that it cannot be performed
within one year, then the contract does not fall within the statute of frauds. Niday, S.W.2d
at 920 (citing Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. 1974). Additionally,
"where the agreement, either by its terms or by the nature of the required acts, cannot be
completed within one year, it falls within the statute and must therefore be in writing."
Niday, 643 S.W.2d at 920 (citing Hall v. Hall, 308 S.W.2d 12 (1957)).
38. In re Kilroy, 354 B.R. 476 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
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member of the LLC, then, under Delaware law,39 Guerriero would have
standing to bring that lawsuit. 40 In this procedural context-a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a remediable claim-the court indulged all tes-
timony and facts in favor of the party seeking to act (Guerriero), found
determinative fact issues to be disputed, and refused to grant the
motion.4 1
The more interesting parts of the case included a bankruptcy issue that
depended on finding a fiduciary duty. Under United States Bankruptcy
Code § 523(a)(4), a discharge that otherwise disposes of the debtor's obli-
gations to third parties does not discharge debts based on "fraud or defal-
cation while acting in a fiduciary capacity .... ",42 Determining whether a
fiduciary relationship existed required the court to examine both state
and federal law.43 Looking to Delaware law, the court found that, be-
cause Kilroy was the majority owner of the LLC that was the general
partner of the limited partnership at issue, Kilroy owed fiduciary duties to
Guerriero-a minority owner of the limited partner.44 The court invoked
analogous Delaware corporate law that a majority shareholder is a con-
trolling shareholder, and that control is the key to finding a fiduciary rela-
tionship (in fact, even without the majority ownership, control would
carry the day). 45 The court found Kilroy's control to be sufficient to sup-
port an assertion that § 523(a)(4) applied.46
2. In re Lea 47
This case involved cross-suits brought by two partners in a general part-
nership, each alleging a variety of bad acts by the other party, including
waste of business assets, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, fraud, and
unfair competition.48
The Southern District of Texas bankruptcy court offered a primer on
Texas partnership law, after finding that the matter was governed by the
39. Delaware law was applied in this case because the Texas Business Corporation Act
provides that the law of the entity's place of incorporation or formation governs. See TEX.
Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.02 (Vernon 2003).
40. Suit may be brought by a member if a manager or member with authority refuses
to do so or if an effort to cause them to do so is unlikely to succeed. Kilroy, 354 B.R. at
486-87 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §18-1001 (2005)).
41. Id. at 487.
42. Id. at 492 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2006)).
43. The scope of the duty was a matter of federal law, but "whether or not a trust
obligation exists" depended in large measure on state law. Kilroy, 354 B.R. at 493 (citing
LSP Inv. P'ship v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d 779, 784 (5th Cir. 1993)).
44. Kilroy, 354 B.R. at 493.
45. Id. at 493 (citing Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 1983)). Note that
the other Kilroy case discussed in this article confronts a similar "fiduciary capacity" ques-
tion in connection with a § 523(a)(4) claim, and invokes the same state/federal analysis.
However, in that case, the plaintiffs argued that the LLC should be disregarded altogether
on veil-piercing grounds. Consequently, the only entity pertinent to the discussion was the
Texas limited partnership and, therefore, the court in that case applied Texas law for the
state-law portion of the state/federal analysis of fiduciary capacity.
46. Kilroy, 354 B.R. at 493.
47. 360 B.R. 231 (S.D. Tex. 2007)
48. Id. at 237.
1000 [Vol. 61
TRPA.49 The primer included citations to TRPA section 1.03,50 section
3.01,51 sections 4.01(d) and 4.03(b), 52 section 3.02(a), 53 sections 2.06 and
8.02, 54 sections 6.01(a) and 6.01(b),55 section 8.01,56 section 4.04, 57 section
2.06(a), 58 section 7.01(a), 59 sections 6.02(a) and 7.01(b), 60 section 8.02,61
section 8.06,62 sections 1.01(2) and 4.01(a), 63 and section 4.01(b). 64
There was no written partnership agreement in this case. And the oral
understandings apparently were skimpy, too-each party was a fifty per-
cent partner, Mokhabery was to provide start-up capital, and Leal was to
handle the day-to-day business matters. Among the things on which the
49. The court noted the existence of the Texas Business Organizations Code, but cor-
rectly stated that it did not apply here because this partnership was formed before January
1, 2006. Leal, 360 B.R. at 235 n.1.
50. See TRPA, supra note 3, at § 1.03. The TRPA governs the relationship between
the partners unless their partnership agreement provides otherwise. Id.
51. See id. § 3.01. Noting that a partnership has the same powers as an individual or a
corporation to do the things necessary to carry on its business. Id.
52. See id. §§ 4.01(d); 4.03(b). Each partner has equal rights to participate in the man-
agement of the business, unless they otherwise agree. Id.
53. See id. § 3.02(a). Each partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of
carrying on its business, and the act of each binds the others, unless the partner has no
actual authority. Id.
54. See id. §§ 2.06, 8.02. Unless the partners have agreed that a partnership is for a
term or particular undertaking, it is a partnership "at will." Id.
55. See id. § 6.01(a)-(b). A partner ceases to be a partner on the occurrence of an
event of withdrawal of that partner, some of which require winding-up and others do not.
Id. As the court noted, one that does not is a partner's giving notice to the partnership that
it is withdrawing as a partner. Leal, 360 B.R. at 235 (citing TRPA, supra note 3, at
§ 6.01(b)(1)).
56. See TRPA, supra note 3, at § 8.01. This section outlines events that require wind-
ing-up of a partnership, including "the express will of a majority-in-interest of the partners,
the entry of certain judicial decrees, and a request for winding-up the partnership from a
partner,...." Leal, 360 B.R. at 235 (citing TRPA, supra note 3, at § 8.01).
57. See TRPA, supra note 3, at § 4.04. This section sets forth the duties owed by part-
ners to one another and to the partnership. In referring to this section, the court said that
the partners owe "fiduciary duties as a matter of law, including a duty of loyalty and care."
Leal, 360 B.R. at 235 (citing both TRPA, supra note 3, at § 4.04; Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998) ). However, under the TRPA partners expressly
(emphasized by the Bar Committee Comments quoted there) do not owe fiduciary duties,
as such. See TRPA, supra note 3, at § 4.04.
58. See TRPA, supra note 3, at § 2.06(a). This section allows partners to continue the
partnership on the occurrence of an event of withdrawal affecting one of them. Id.
59. See id. § 7.01(a). This section says that if no event requiring a winding-up occurs
within 60 days after the event of withdrawal affecting the partner, then the partner is enti-
tled to have its partnership interest redeemed (that is, bought) by the partnership. Id.
60. See id. § 7.01(b). This section identifies the redemption price as the fair value of
the partner's interest as of the date of the partner's withdrawal, if the partner's withdrawal
is not wrongful. Id.
61. See id. § 8.02. When an event of winding-up occurs, the partnership continues un-
til that winding-up is completed, after which the partnership is terminated. Id.
62. See id. § 8.06. On winding-up, partnership assets are first applied to discharge any
outstanding debts and liabilities, with any surplus being paid to partners who have positive
capital account balances. Id.
63. See id. §§ 1.01(2), 4.01(a). A partner's capital account balance is determined by
crediting any contributions made by or profits allocated to the partner, and reduced by any
losses allocated to or distributions of property made to the partner. Id.
64. See id. § 4.01(b). Unless the partners agree otherwise, each partner is responsible
for a partnership's losses in the same proportion that it shares the partnership's profits. Id.
2008] Partnerships 1001
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partners had not agreed was a partnership term or whether any specific
or specified events would require winding-up and termination. Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that "the partnership was at the will of each
partner. '65
Drawing from its primer, the court reiterated its view that the partners
owed to one another and to the partnership fiduciary duties, including the
duties of loyalty and care. 66 While the partners do, indeed, owe to each
other and to the partnership the duties of loyalty and care, as well as the
obligation to exercise those duties in good faith,67 the duties were not
intended to be the same as those owed by a "pure" fiduciary, such as a
trustee. The State Bar Committee that drafted the TRPA made this very
clear in its comments, saying:
This section defines partner duties and implies that they are not to be
expanded by loose use of "fiduciary" concepts from other contexts
or by the rhetoric of some prior cases. Similarly, subsection (f) [of
this section] specifically states that a partner as such is not a trustee
and is not held to the same standards as a trustee, thus further at-
tempting to restrict reliance on the unfortunate language of prior
law. The term "fiduciary" is inappropriate when used to describe the
duties of a partner because a partner, unlike a true trustee, may legit-
imately pursue the partner's own self interest and not solely the in-
terest of fellow partners or the partnership. 68
Nevertheless, the Texas Supreme Court has implied that the duties
owed by partners under the TRPA have not changed, at least in some
contexts.69 One bankruptcy case did go into considerable detail on this
subject, citing the Bar Committee legislative history quoted above. The
issue there, like here, was whether there were "sufficient" fiduciary-like
duties involved to implicate 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). 70
The court set the stage for the rest of its discussion when it said: "After
reviewing all the evidence, it is clear that this dispute arose because
neither Leal nor Mokhabery took his fiduciary duty seriously. '71 In fact,
the court was pretty disgusted: "The conduct of both parties is inexcus-
able, however the conduct of Leal is much more atrocious. ' 72
65. Leal, 360 B.R. at 236.
66. Id.
67. TRPA, supra note 3, at § 4.04(d).
68. See TRPA, supra note 3, at § 4.04, Comment of Bar Committee 1993.
69. See M.R. Champion, Inc. v. Mizell, 904 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1995). That case was
governed by the predecessor to the TRPA, but the supreme court said in dicta that a part-
ner's fiduciary duties under that predecessor statute have remained the same under theTRPA: "Partners owe each other and their partnership a duty in the nature of a fiduciaryduty in the conduct and winding up of partnership business, and are liable for a breach of
that duty." MR. Champion, 904 S.W.2d at 618 (citing TRPA, supra note 3, at §§ 4.04,
4.05).
70. See In re Gupta, 394 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Circuit 2004). For this purpose, the "trus-
tee" level fiduciary duties were not required.
71. Leal, 360 B.R. at 237.
72. Id. at 242.
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The opinion had a good discussion of the rules that apply when one
partner withdraws from a two-person partnership: (i) the withdrawing
partner's only right was to have his interest redeemed, 73 (ii) the with-
drawal caused an event requiring a winding up (because a partnership
must have two partners, and there would be only one remaining after the
withdrawal),74 (iii) the sole remaining partner had the authority to wind
up the business of the partnership, which includes satisfying partnership
debts from the proceeds of liquidating partnership assets, and continuing
as a partner until winding up was completed and the partnership's legal
existence terminated,75 and (iv) the withdrawing partner, though he had
no interest in partnership property and owed no fiduciary duties because
he was no longer a partner, did owe duties to the partnership as a former
agent of the partnership after the agency was terminated. 76 The court
ordered Leal, the withdrawing partner, to pay the partnership, with inter-
est, for the value of his misuse of partnership assets, and ordered
Mokhabery, the remaining partner, to repay to the partnership unautho-
rized withdrawals taken by him.77 What a mess!
D. PIERCING THE VEIL
1. In re JNS Aviation, Part 178
This case is short on substance relevant to this discussion, but it does
elucidate to some degree the nature of a veil-piercing claim under Texas
law.79 It also is the precursor to the next case discussed in this Survey
article. It therefore merits at least a passing mention.
The two issues in this case germane to veil-piercing are (1) whether a
veil-piercing claim is required to be litigated in the same lawsuit as the
underlying cause of action to which it relates8 0 and (2) whether veil-pierc-
ing is a cause of action that rightfully belongs to the bankruptcy estate of
the entity whose veil is to be pierced.
81
73. Id. at 240. Instead, Leal took partnership assets and used them in a new business,
which the court found to constitute conversion.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 243. The court chastised this partner for starting and running a competing
business before he had completed the winding up of this partnership, as required by the
TRPA. So, even though the other partner, Leal, withdrew and took partnership assets to
begin a new business, that did not excuse Mokhabery from his "remaining-partner" wind-
ing up duties. Id. at 242-43.
76. Id. at 241.
77. Id. at 243.
78. In re JNS Aviation, 350 B.R. 283 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
79. For purposes of this case, the court did not need to, and did not, decide the ulti-
mate merits of the plaintiff's veil-piercing claim. To reach its conclusion regarding the
bankruptcy trustee's proposed settlement of claims, the court needed only to dispose of
certain preliminary questions, such as whether a veil-piercing claim must be litigated with
the substantive cause of action that gave rise to the underlying liability, and whether a veil-
piercing claim is personal to the plaintiff/creditor or, instead, a cause of action belonging to
the bankruptcy estate.
80. JNS Aviation, 350 B.R. at 289.
81. Id. at 290. This is itself an interesting concept-normally, one worries about a
third party piercing the veil and getting to the entity's owners; here, for the entity itself (in
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On the first issue, the Northern District of Texas bankruptcy court
found ample authority for the proposition that veil-piercing can be raised
to hold third parties liable on a debt established by an earlier judgment.8 2
It follows, then, that a veil-piercing claim need not relate only to those
substantive causes of action that are raised in the same case.83 Similarly,
recovery under veil-piercing theories was also not limited to that availa-
ble under same-case substantive causes of action.84
On the second issue, the court was not as decisive, probably because it
did not have to be to reach and support its ultimate holding in the case.85
After discussing at length three Fifth Circuit cases, 86 the court reached
the conclusion that "veil piercing theories are arguably property of the
bankruptcy estate and thus the Trustee is responsible for administering
such asset. ' 87
2. In re JNS Aviation, Part H88
This case involved a claim based on veil-piercing theories against the
principals of a defunct limited liability company and other business enti-
ties owned by the principals.
Texas courts apply to limited liability companies the same state law
principles for piercing the corporate veil that are applied to corpora-
tions.89 The starting point of any analysis of potential liability under veil-
piercing theories is section 21.223 of the TBOC, which states, in pertinent
part: "A holder of shares ... may not be held liable to the corporation or
its obligees with respect to . . . any contractual obligation of the corpora-
tion or any matter relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis
that the holder ... was the alter ego of the corporation or on the basis of
bankruptcy) to pursue those same owners who gave birth to it . . . well, that's just
interesting.
82. Id. at 289 (citing Matthews Const. Co., Inc. v. Rosen, 796 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1990)).
83. In so finding, the court rejected an argument advanced by the bankruptcy trus-
tee-no doubt with the strong support of the defendants-that, because veil-piercing is
"remedial in nature and must be tied to a substantive cause of action," and because the
substantive causes of action at issue in the case were already adequately addressed in the
trustee's proposed settlement, the veil-piercing claim added no additional value. Id. at 288.
84. Id. at 288-90. The "substantive" causes of action in this case were claims of fraudu-
lent transfer and breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiff argued successfully that the veil-
piercing claim was tied not only to the fraudulent transfer and breach of fiduciary duty
claims, but also to a previous breach of contract claim that had been reduced to a judgment
in plaintiff's favor.
85. The court held that the trustee's proposed settlement did not adequately resolve
the veil-piercing claims and therefore could not be approved in its entirety. Id. at 292-94.
86. In re Acquisitions, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1152 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that alter
ego-a veil-piercing theory-is a "right of action" belonging to the debtor and is the prop-
erty of the estate); In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1983); Matter of
Educators Group Health Trust, 25 F.3d 1281, 1284 (5th Cir.1994) ("If a cause of action
alleges only indirect harm to a creditor [(i.e., an injury which derives from harm to the
debtor)], and the debtor could have raised a claim for its direct injury under the applicable
law, then the cause of action belongs to the estate.").
87. JNS Aviation, 350 B.R. at 292.
88. In re JNS Aviation, 376 B.R. 500 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
89. Id. at 526 (citing McCarthy v. Wani Venture, A.S., 251 S.W.3d 573, 589 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)).
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actual or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other similar
theory." 90 Subsection (b) of section 21.223 goes on to say that subsection
(a)(2), which contains the language quoted above, "does not prevent or
limit the liability of a holder . . . if the obligee demonstrates that the
holder.., caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrat-
ing and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the
direct personal benefit of the holder." 9t
After quoting the above statutory standard, the court reviewed Texas
Supreme Court 92 and the Fifth Circuit 93 authority applicable to veil-
piercing. The structure of the court's opinion seems to suggest, though
the court did not explicitly state, that the referenced case law on veil-
piercing has not been rendered moot by the Texas legislature's subse-
quent exposition on the veil-piercing doctrine. Instead, the implication is
that the strands of veil-piercing recognized judicially can be relied on to
advance a veil-piercing theory, but that ultimately the requirements of
the statute-such as findings of actual fraud and direct personal benefit-
have to be satisfied for such theories to prevail.94
In assessing whether the facts of the case fall under any of the recog-
nized veil-piercing theories, the court referred primarily to the three
strands of corporate disregard expounded by the Fifth Circuit, namely:
"(1) the alter ego prong; (2) use of the corporate form as an illegal pur-
pose . . .; and (3) sham to perpetrate a fraud." 95
Plaintiff Nick Corp. alleged, and the court agreed, that the principals of
JNS Aviation depleted the assets of the company and filed bankruptcy to
avoid liability for a previous default judgment obtained against JNS Avia-
tion by Nick Corp.96 The court found that the facts did not support the
first two strands of corporate disregard-alter ego97 and illegal pur-
90. Id. (citing TEX. Bus. OROS. CODE ANN. § 21.223 (Vernon 2006)).
91. Id. at 526-27 (citing TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (Vernon 2006)).
92. In explaining the Texas Supreme Court standard, the circuit court noted that,
under Texas law, the corporate veil should be pierced when the corporate form has been
used as part of a basically unfair device to achieve an inequitable result. "Specifically, we
disregard the corporate fiction: (1) when the fiction is used as a means of perpetrating
fraud; (2) where a corporation is organized and operated as a mere tool or business conduit
of another corporation; (3) where the corporate fiction is resorted to as a means of evading
an existing legal obligation; (4) where the corporate fiction is employed to achieve or per-
petrate monopoly; (5) where the corporate fiction is used to circumvent a statute; and (6)
where the corporate fiction is relied upon as a protection of crime or to justify wrong."
JNS Aviation, 376 B.R. at 527 (quoting Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271-72
(Tex. 1986)). In a footnote, the Texas Supreme Court added a seventh ground for veil-
piercing-inadequate capitalization. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272 n.3.
93. See Gibraltar Say. v. LDBrinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1988).
94. JNS Aviation, 376 B.R. at 530-31.
95. Id. at 527 (citing Gibraltar, 860 F.2d at 1287-90).
96. Id. at 530.
97. Id. at 529-30. The court equates the alter ego prong (the Fifth Circuit's parlance)
with single business enterprise theory of corporate disregard (the Texas Supreme Court's
usage), explaining that it is "an equitable doctrine applied to reflect partnership type prin-
ciples when corporations integrate their resources and operations to achieve a common
business purpose." Id. at 528 (citing 15 TEX. JUR. 3D CORPORATIONS § 173 (2007)). The
court found that, while the entities in question were operated for a common business pur-
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pose 9 8-but did satisfy the third-sham to commit a fraud.99
"Sham to commit a fraud" is the broadest strand of veil-piercing-the
catchall. 100 The emphasis is on "whether honoring legal independence
would result in 'inequity' or 'injustice."' 101 The typical fact pattern of
such a sham involves a closely-held corporation that owes unwanted obli-
gations and whose owners syphon off corporate assets to hinder the cor-
poration's ability to pay its debts.10 2 That is precisely what happened
with this limited liability company. 10 3
But did the sham constitute an actual fraud for the personal benefit of
the defendants? 10 4 "Actual fraud occurs when (i) a party conceals or fails
to disclose a material fact within the knowledge of that party; (ii) the
party knows that the other party is ignorant of the fact and does not have
an equal opportunity to discover the truth; (iii) the party intends the
other party to take some action by concealing or failing to disclose the
fact; and (iv) the other party suffers injury as a result of acting without
knowledge of the undisclosed fact. '10 5
The court found that all elements of fraud were present here. The
company and its principals allowed Nick Corp. to take a default judgment
against the company, then transferred all of the company's assets (but not
the liability of the default judgment) to a new entity and failed to inform
Nick Corp.-which was by then a judgment creditor-of the formation
of, and transfer of assets to, the new entity.106
That the fraud was for the personal benefit of the defendants also was
clear. No other shareholders (members) besides the defendants existed.
Accordingly, they had no other interest to serve. In fact, their actions
showed they desired to continue operations in a new entity unencum-
bered by the previous default judgment "for their own personal bene-
pose, the entities did not operate at the same time, and therefore did not justify a finding of
alter ego. Id. at 530.
98. "The illegal purpose doctrine [relates] ... to the use of a corporate form as a
technique for avoiding legal limitations upon natural persons or corporations." Aviation,
376 B.R. at 530 (citing 15 TEX. JUR. 3D CORPORATIONS § 174 (2007)). The focus of the
illegal purpose doctrine is on legal obligations to the state, and it was not clear to the court
that the legal obligation at issue in this case (that is, an existing civil judgment) was the
type of legal obligation contemplated by the courts under this strand of the veil-piercing
theory. Id. (citing Gibraltar, 860 F.2d at 1288).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 528. "Neither intentional fraud nor intent to defraud need be shown to sat-
isfy this strand." Id. (citing Gibraltar, 860 F.2d at 1289).
101. Id. (citing Gibraltar, 860 F.2d at 1289).
102. Id. at 529 (citing Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 275).
103. Id. at 530 ("The court is satisfied that the overriding purpose of closing down JNS
Aviation and continuing operations under [another entity's] shield was to isolate Nick
Corp.'s Default Judgment in a worthless shell.").
104. Id. Puzzlingly, the court did not cite Texas Business Organization Code section
21.223 in connection with this inquiry, which the court acknowledged, "must be resolved
under the umbrella of the veil-piercing claims." Id.
105. Id. (citing Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 754-55 (Tex. 2001)).
106. Id. at 531. "A company that ceases operations, liquidates, and closes down has a
duty to advise its outstanding creditors of such facts." Id. (citing Texas Limited Liability
Company Act, TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 1528n, art. 6.05(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008)).
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fit.' 1 0 7 Just reciting these facts suggests that the result was an easy one
for the court to reach.
3. In re Moore10 8
This case involved a claim based on the theory of "reverse corporate
veil piercing," the notion of an entity's assets being available to satisfy
liabilities of individuals who treated the entity as their alter ego. 10 9 The
opinion's chief value is in its rather thorough exposition of the doctrines
of veil-piercing and reverse veil-piercing, particularly its frank critique of
the "thin roots" of reverse veil-piercing in Texas jurisprudence °10 and the
"scant" and "spotty" authority that has given rise to its assertion."'
Neither the Texas legislature nor the Texas Supreme Court has clearly
adopted reverse veil-piercing as a legal principle, and the Texas and Fifth
Circuit courts that have recognized the principle have not established
guidelines or limits for its use.112 That troubled this court for at least two
reasons. First, it seemed to the court that reverse veil-piercing "has
evolved and become accepted into the mainstream, starkly during a time
when the Texas Legislature is limiting the availability of traditional veil
piercing. 1" 3 Second, the court "fears that parties and courts may be ex-
panding their view of the availability of the reverse veil-piercing remedy,
without meaningfully considering all of the due process rights of the pre-




The court therefore adopted the view advanced by courts in some other
circuits that "reverse veil piercing should only be applied when it is clear
that it will not prejudice non-culpable shareholders or other stakeholders
(such as creditors) of a corporation."'1 5 However, the court stopped
107. Id.
108. In re Moore, 379 B.R. 284 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
109. Id. at 292.
110. Id. at 289.
111. Id. at 292-93.
112. Id. at 294-95.
113. Id. at 294 n.6. The court cites three distinct times that the Texas legislature has
revised article 2.21 of the Texas Business Corporations Act to limit the availability of the
alter ego doctrine. Id. at 291 (citing 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws Serv., 974 § 1 (West); 1993 Tex.
Gen. Laws, 446 § 2.05 (West); 1997 Tex. Gen. Law, 1522, § 7 (West)).
114. Moore, 379 B.R. at 295. The court notes that, while reverse veil-piercing might
have straightforward application in the context of a small, wholly-owned corporation, there
could be unintended consequences when the remedy is applied broadly in commercial liti-
gation contexts. Id. For example, the court envisioned "a creditor who loaned money to
an individual, with only the legitimate expectation of being able to reach the individual's
assets-including perhaps his stock in a corporation-is suddenly attempting to reach the
assets of the corporation that might have its own significant creditors." Id. As further rea-
son for caution, the court noted another potential side effect of the expansive application
of reverse veil-piercing: "The remedy arguably perverts established Bankruptcy Code pri-
orities and state law creditor rights provisions, by putting creditors of an individual share-
holder on a parity with creditors of the corporation (when logic suggests they should, at
best, merely step into the shoes of the individual shareholder vis-a-vis the corporation-
not share pari passu with the corporation's preexisting creditors)." Id.
115. Id. at 295-96 (citing Stoebner v. Lingenfelter, 115 F.3d 576, 579-80 (8th Cir. 1997);
Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 1995); Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v.
Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1575 (10th Cir. 1990)).
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short of saying that, per se, reverse veil-piercing cannot be invoked to
make claims on an entity's assets if the entity has non-culpable
stakeholders.' 16
Particular facts of this case highlight an additional wrinkle in the re-
verse veil-piercing doctrine. 117 The culpable individual, Mr. Moore, did
not actually own an equity interest in the corporation or the limited liabil-
ity company that were his alleged alter egos. Though he exercised total
control over the corporation and, for a time, substantial control over the
limited liability company, Mr. Moore (who was saddled with significant
debts) was careful to establish ownership of the corporation as his wife's
separate property. Similarly, the equity interest in the limited liability
company was actually a fifty percent stake held by his wife's corporation,
not by Mr. Moore." 8 These facts alone, however, were insufficient to
justify summary judgment in favor of the corporation and the limited lia-
bility company. "[W]hile there must be an ownership interest between an
individual and the corporation whose separateness is sought to be disre-
garded," the court found, "it is possible that such ownership might exist
indirectly or implicitly-such as where the actual record holder of the
shares of the corporation holds them as a sham for the individual."'" 9
A concluding thought-reverse veil-piercing, while clearly judicially
recognized in some form, is fraught with uncertainty and potential pit-
falls. It plays a useful role in disregarding the corporate fiction to prevent
the use of business entities by the unscrupulous to shield personal assets
from those creditors who would not otherwise have an adequate remedy.
On the other hand, if it is applied too liberally, it can undermine expecta-
tions that are founded on long-standing principles of law. This seems like
an area ripe for attention from the Texas Supreme Court or the Texas
legislature.
4. In re Kilroy 120
This case, a ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
addresses two exceptions to discharge of a debt in bankruptcy. 21 Each of
116. Id. at 296. The court acknowledged that logic would suggest that other stakehold-
ers surely would be prejudiced by the imposition of reverse veil-piercing. However, show-
ing great judicial restraint, the court concluded that "evidence, not logic, is necessary on
this point." Id. at 297.
117. The application of the law to the facts in this case should be understood in the
context of the case's procedural posture. Because the case is a ruling on the defendants'
motion for summary judgment, all facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the creditor
plaintiff who is invoking the remedy of reverse veil-piercing.
118. Id. at 286-88.
119. Id. at 296 (citing Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, 910 F.2d 240 (5th
Cir.1990)).
120. In re Kilroy, 357 B.R. 411 (S.D. Tex. 2006). This is the second Kilroy case.
121. The two exceptions to discharge urged by the plaintiffs are found in 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2005) and 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2000). Section
523(a)(2)(A) provides, in pertinent part: "A discharge under section 727 . . . does not
discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . to the extent obtained by ... a false
representation, or actual fraud." Section 523(a)(4) exempts from discharge "any debt ...
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the invoked exceptions to discharge in this case rested, in part, on a claim
that falls within the scope of this Survey article.122 One hinged on a veil-
piercing claim and the other on a claim involving the breach by a putative
general partner of a fiduciary duty owed to limited partners. 123
The plaintiffs in this case were individual investors in a limited partner-
ship, Aegis 2000, whose sole purpose was to invest in an LLC, Final Ar-
rangements. 124 In their first claim, the plaintiffs argued that they decided
to invest based on fraudulent statements and misrepresentations made by
Final Arrangements and its agent, and that those communications should,
on veil-piercing grounds, be attributed to the defendant, Mr. Kilroy, an
owner of the company.' 25
In determining whether the plaintiffs' pleadings were sufficient on the
veil-piercing question, the Texas choice of law statute dictated the appli-
cation of Delaware law-the law of Final Arrangements' state of forma-
tion.126 Under Delaware law, the corporate veil can be pierced where an
entity is found to be the alter ego of its shareholder. 127 In this instance,
the court found that alter ego could be established either by collateral
estoppel-recognizing a previous court's finding of alter ego-or by satis-
fying the alter ego analysis under Delaware law.' 28 An exposition of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel is beyond the scope of this article, but we
offer a brief synopsis of some of the salient points of the alter ego theory
under Delaware law.
Certain fundamental similarities can be found between Delaware and
Texas law regarding corporate veil-piercing. Delaware courts, like their
Texas counterparts, look not only to threshold indicators of alter ego,
such as abandonment of corporate formalities or abuse of the corporate
form, but also focus on the net effect of the dominant shareholder's mis-
behavior on the corporation and others.' 29 Giving a flavor of Delaware
and Second Circuit precedent on the subject, the court found that veil-
piercing must be justified by additional, more egregious circumstances,
such as: (1) an "overall element of injustice or unfairness;"'' 30 or (2) that
the corporation was a sham, existing for "no other purpose than as a vehi-
cle for fraud;"'131 or (3) that the entity was the subject of "exclusive domi-
for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity." The latter is discussed with
the first Kilroy case, supra notes 38-46 and corresponding text.
122. While the court's opinion must be understood in the context of its procedural pos-
ture-all allegations being accepted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs-the dis-
cussion of what must be alleged (and subsequently proved) to establish the claims at issue
justifies its inclusion here.
123. Kilroy, 357 B.R. at 423, 430-31.
124. Id. at 417, 421.
125. Id. at 422-24.
126. Id. at 425 (citing Alberto v. Diversified Group, Inc., 55 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir.
1995) and TEX. Bus. CORP. ACr. ANN. art. 8.02 (Vernon 2003)).
127. Id. (citing Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 61 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 428 (citing Alberto, 55 F.3d at 205).
130. Id. (quoting Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2nd Cir.1995)).
131. Id. (quoting Wallace v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999)).
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nation or control" and had lost "its own legal or independent
significance. 1 3
2
This case also highlights an important difference between Delaware
and Texas case law. While a number of Texas courts-though not the
Texas Supreme Court or the Texas legislature-have held that corporate
veil-piercing principles apply to both corporations and Limited Liability
Corporations without distinction,1 33 "[t]here is a dearth of Delaware case
law on the issue of whether an LLC's corporate veil may be pierced. '134
The court's holding in this case, that veil-piercing could be applied to
LLCs, was based on a single Delaware case that endorsed LLC veil-pierc-
ing in theory.1 35
As part of their second cause of action, the plaintiffs alleged, under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), that Mr. Kilroy committed fraud and defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary capacity. 136 The "fiduciary capacity" in this
instance was that of putative managing partner of Aegis 2000,137 and the
question before the court was whether a managing partner stands in a
fiduciary capacity to limited partners as that concept is narrowly defined
in the context of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) claims.138 The court explained
that finding the answer is a two-step process involving both federal and
state law.139 Federal law dictates the scope of the concept of fiduciary,
but "state law is important in determining whether or not a trust obliga-
tion exists.' 40 Under Texas law, a managing partner "stands in the same
fiduciary capacity to the limited partners as a trustee stands to the benefi-
ciaries of the trust,"' 41 the court found, and the fiduciary duty owed to
the limited partners is "sufficient... to satisfy the requirements of section
523(a)(4). ' ' 142
132. Id. at 428-29 (quoting Wallace, 752 A.2d at 1184).
133. See supra note 89.
134. Kilroy, 357 B.R. at 430.
135. Id. (citing Trs. of the Vill. of Arden v. Unity Constr. Co., No. C.A. 15025, 2000 WL
130627, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2000)).
136. Id. at 432. The same issue, but involving different entities, is discussed regarding
the first Kilroy case, supra 38-46 and corresponding text.
137. The record managing partner of Aegis 2000 was Aegis Asset Management, Inc.
(Aegis Asset), of which Mr. Kilroy was the sole owner and manager. The plaintiffs as-
serted, ostensibly on veil-piercing grounds, that Mr. Kilroy was, in effect, the managing
partner of Aegis 2000. Id. at 421, 430.
138. Id. at 432 (quoting LSP Inv. P'ship v. Bennett, 989 F.2d 779, 784 (5th Cir. 1993)).
139. Id. at 432 (citing Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Barrett, 156 B.R. 529, 533 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1993)).
140. Id. (quoting Bennett, 989 F.2d at 784).
141. Id. at 433 (quoting Watson v. Ltd. Partners of WCKT, Ltd., 570 S.W.2d 179, 182
(Tex. App.-Austin 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). But see the discussion, supra in the text at
footnotes 66-68.
142. Id. (quoting Bennett, 989 F.2d at 787).
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E. THE ENTITY THEORY
1. Peoples Bank v. Bryan Brothers Cattle Co. 14
3
This Fifth Circuit case involves Mississippi law and, consequently, logi-
cally falls outside the ambit of this publication. In addition, the issue in
the case is not monumental. However, the case allows us to issue a re-
minder that seemed worthy enough to cover.
The issue here, whether the seller of cattle had "rights in collateral"
sufficient to grant a lien to a bank, turned on whether the relationship
among several people constituted a partnership, an LLC, or neither. 144
The partnership/LLC principle in the case is that a partnership or an LLC
is a separate entity.145 If the relevant assets are owned by a partnership
or an LLC, then the partners or members do not have rights in those
assets/collateral sufficient to grant a lien to secure their individual
debts.146
The rest of the case was not jurisprudentially significant, and mostly
reflected the procedural posture of the case. The district court granted a
summary judgment based on its finding that cattle were owned by an
LLC.147 The Fifth Circuit decided that there was insufficient evidence to
support a summary judgment for either party-it found enough evidence
of the existence of a partnership to raise a fact issue that precluded sum-
mary judgment that there was not one, and inadequate evidence of the
existence of a limited liability company to support the lower court's sum-
mary judgment that there was one, and it reversed and remanded the case
to the district court. 148
F. CONCLUSION
The cases decided during the Survey period mostly are not remarkable
for their partnership law contributions. A few things stand out: (i) courts
are loathe to eliminate "fiduciary" from the lexicon, notwithstanding the
legislature's admonitions in 1983, (ii) the liability shield offered by some
entities is not absolute in the face of particularly egregious conduct, and
(iii) we are at the beginning of a period that should prove fertile for lim-
ited liability cases decided under Texas law.
143. People Bank v. Bryan Bros. Cattle Co., 504 F.3d 549 (5th Cir. 2007).
144. Peoples Bank, 504 F.3d at 553-55.
145. Id. at 553.
146. Id. at 554; see also TRPA, supra note 3, at § 2.01 ("A partnership is an entity
distinct from its partners."); TRPA, supra note 3, at § 5.01 ("A partner is not a co-owner of
partnership property and does not have an interest that can be transferred, either volunta-
rily or involuntarily, in partnership property.").
147. Id. at 558.
148. Id. at 558-60. The ultimate issue was whether a person who bought the cattle from
seller or two banks with pre-existing security interests in seller's property had greater
rights in the cattle. Id.
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